Middle Ground

Author: Fahim Ahmed

As the U.S.-led coalition advances into the streets of Baghdad - signaling the imminent demise of Saddam Hussein's regime - the dogs of war have been unleashed over the control of post-war Iraq. While the military battle over Iraq may conclude in the next few weeks with a coalition victory, the outcome of the political and diplomatic battle to ensue thereafter appears far less certain. In a war that has challenged long-standing global alliances, consensus over the nature of post-war administration in Iraq is far from achieved.
The United States, the United Kingdom, Security Council members France, Germany and Russia, Turkey, the United Nations and the exiled Iraqi opposition forces have determined their positions in this intense diplomatic battle over the control of Iraq. The views and positions on the future of Iraq after Hussein are as divisive as the interests and stakes of the key players in this conflict. Each player strives to either wrest control or ensure for itself a significant role in the post-war administration, in order to safeguard its own political, financial or security interests.
The United States has, thus far, maintained its position that the post-war administration in Iraq will be configured at the choosing of the U.S.-led coalition, and not at the behest of the United Nations. The United States sees the United Nations as playing a limited role, confined to areas such as the distribution of humanitarian aid, rather than administering a trusteeship in the model of East Timor. The U.S. position, as articulated by Colin Powell to Secretary General Kofi Annan, holds that since it had taken the "political risk" of removing the Iraqi regime, it is only appropriate that the U.S. lead the political reforms of Iraq.
The U.S. hard-line stance on the question of post-war Iraq has therefore resurfaced the initial skepticism on actual motives underlying its push for military action. The stated rationale for a U.S.-led occupation is: (1) to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq and its neighbors; (2) to find chemical and biological weapons that will validate its pursued doctrine of preemptive war; and (3) to install a representative and democratic civilian administration.
The stated objectives, however, belie the underlying motives of U.S. leadership in post-war reconstructions. First, it is in its economic interest that the United States administers Iraq's oil reserves to prevent fluctuation in world prices that may delay a recovery in the U.S economy. A leading role of the United States over the management of Iraqi national assets may also minimize its own spending on foreign aid to Iraq that it would have otherwise incurred had the reconstruction been conducted under U.N. auspices.
Second, it is in its geo-strategic interest that the future Iraqi administration be not only democratic, but also closely aligned with the United States, to tip the regional balance of power against its adversary Iran. A Shiite dominated administration in Iraq may foster closer ties with Iran, and a significant U.S. role in the post-war interim administration may prevent that undesirable outcome. Third, it is in its financial interest that leading U.S. firms, some of which have strong ties with the Bush administration, execute the lucrative rebuilding contracts.
For the United Nations, its very relevance - questioned and doubted during the diplomatic fallout that preceded the war - may well rest in its role in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. The United Nations finds itself caught between a rock and a very hard place - it cannot legitimize the invasion that occurred without its consent, nor can it walk into oblivion by removing itself from the rebuilding process. Thus, the United Nations pursues the treacherous course of pushing for a leadership role in post-war Iraq while maintaining its reservations over the legitimacy and legality of the war.
Security Council members including France, Russia and Germany have their own economic interest in the rebuilding. Iraq owes over $300 billion to aforementioned countries - including France, Russia and Germany - and the interim administration will play a determining role in the debt liquidation process. The United Kingdom probably has the hardest task of all. Prime Minister Blair had invested so much of his own political capital in this war, that only a quick victory followed by a seamless reconstruction of Iraq, administered by the United Nations with broad global support, may guarantee his survival.
Turkey, on the other hand, has its territorial integrity to protect. Any move towards independence or autonomy for ethnic Kurds in Iraq may fuel the demand for a unified state of Kurdistan, impairing the territorial integrity of Turkey. Finally, the Iraqi National Congress led by Ahmad Chalabi and the Kurdish Democratic Party led by Masoud Barzani have their own aspirations for political leadership in Iraq, which make their participation in the interim administration absolutely vital. The imminent political and diplomatic struggle therefore promises to be just as divisive as the war on Iraq.