Other Lands

On the 10th of January 2013, after Islamist forces from the north of Mali started advancing south towards the capital Bamako, the Malian government demanded help from the French military. Through either post-colonial guilt or neo-colonial greed, the French committed to ensuring political stability in the region, as they have previously (see their joint intervention with the UN in the Ivory Coast in 2011). Subsequently, since Jan. 12 the French military have provided their assistance by bombing Islamist-held towns along with their important infrastructure, as well as recently deploying troops on the ground. So far, the operation has been a relative success with the retaking of several key towns and an overall retreat of the jihadists.

The UN backed France’s intervention, but only a few days after it had started. It is strange to think that nations can so freely send troops, bomb and kill citizens of other nations prior to any international accord. There is no doubt that on the face of it, this operation took place in good faith. But if good faith was really enough to send young men and women into war-zones, then President Assad would no longer be killing his citizens in Syria, and human rights abuses would not be part of daily life in so many countries around the world.

One possible partial motive is a sort of military advertisement for the French. We saw them do it in Libya with their shiny new “Rafale” jet fighters. Shortly after that operation they sold 18 fighter jets to India in a $10.4 billion deal. In terms of domestic politics, recently elected socialist president François Hollande is desperate not only to divert attention from his nigh on embarrassing domestic record (superstar actor Gerard Depardieu shamelessly accepted Russian citizenship a fortnight ago in light of Hollande’s new tax policy), but also to present himself as a tough and resolute leader. More importantly, however, is the very real possibility that the Islamist forces, consisting in quite large numbers of former Gaddafi mercenaries, would have prevailed in any kind of civil war, thus giving radical Muslims an entire state — a terrorist safe haven — dangerously close to the underbelly of Western Europe. As a move in the great conflict of the West against radical Islam, this operation makes perfect sense. But as one of the western countries with the most significant Muslim populations, especially coming from Northern and Western Africa, this represents a high risk of radicalization. There is also a high probability that similar groups will plot revenge attacks against the French.

Aside from political ploys, the decision to send ground troops to Mali reminds us of countless other risky “wars” from the last 50 years (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq). I put “wars” in quotation marks because I believe that in circumstances such as these, in which an external army intervenes in an internal conflict, it is not war in the usual sense. There is only territory at stake for the militants. There is only a willingness to die from the militants. There is also no direct threat to the French people or their territory, thus the French soldiers have so much less to lose. The risk of failure that arises when one tries to fight on other lands is much greater due to the simple fact that the enemy wants to win more than western soldiers ever possibly could.

The soldiers on the ground, advancing through the unknown foreign desert, are solely fighting for a cause. It may be a noble one, but nevertheless it is an ideological one: West vs. radical Islam. Is that cause enough to die for? When you are in another country fighting someone else’s war, you do not have the same motivation as the other side, which really wants to win. The militant jihadists would willingly risk their lives for the conflict. That death is what they live for, it exemplifies their idea of a holy war and it is one of the reasons that wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been so long-winded. Militant Islam is the only force in the modern world with a true belief in what it fights for. For western intervening forces, these fights will only ever be half-hearted. They will only act as passionately as the most well-meaning of mercenaries.

Although the French operation makes sense and is probably the right thing to do, the risks incurred and the potential aftermath which has already kicked off a mass al-Quaeda-backed hostage-taking in Algeria, make it extremely difficult to pull off.